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4Introduction
This study was developed in the frame of the project titled „Fighting corruption in post-
socialist countries: cases of Russia and Hungary” sponsored by USAID, IRIS, KPMG
Consulting Barents Group1 with participation of the following NGOs: Foundation for Market
Economy (Budapest), Center for Independent Social Research (St. Petersburg) and American
University Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (Washington). The Hungarian case
study is devoted to surveying the nature of corruption by reviewing development path of the
public procurement procedure in Hungary.
Purpose of the Hungarian research was to review the different facts and opinions in
connection of setting a limit to reducing corruption in the public procurement procedure and
also to value the chance of developing the anti-corruption practice in it. It could be stated on
the basis of opinions collected at the relevant organizations and enterprises that both the
buyers and sellers are interested in decreasing corruption, increasing transparency and equal
chances and also improving efficiency of operation in course of the public procurement
procedure. FME team is expecting that corruption danger could be decreased by monitoring
the transparency and efficiency of the public procurement procedure and permanent
strengthening of formal contacts.
Participants of the research project express their gratitude to organizations and enterprises for
the helping opinions. They also hope that heir suggestions would contribute to strengthening
the cooperation of related partners, to developing the rule-making and to reducing the
administrative burden, the bureaucracy by demonstrating the nature of corruption in the public
procurement procedures.
The research team of Foundation for Market Economy examined how openness, equal
opportunities, transparency, clarity and efficiency are enforced in terms of the following
aspects:
?  The main institutions inviting tenders based on the value and number of public
procurement procedures (budgetary organs, local governments, public utility
companies, other state-owned organisations);
?  Major product manufacturers and service providers submitting bids based on the value
and number of public procurement procedures.
The survey – due to the nature of the topic – was carried out via in-depth interviews, during
which we guaranteed anonymity to the organisations providing information and provided a
comprehensive summary of their opinions related to the various topics. While conducting the
survey, we interviewed 57 institutions /companies in the following breakdown:
?  Institutions inviting bids: 47%, bidders: 53%;
?  30% of the institutions inviting bids represented the central budgetary organs and their
respective institutions, whereas 37% and 33% represented local governments as well
as public utility and state-owned companies, respectively;
                                               
1This study was developed in the frame of the program “Improvement of Economic Policy Through Think Tank
Partnership” program sponsored by the US. Agency for International Development, IRIS and KPMG Consulting
Barents Group. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
sponsoring authorities
5?  Roughly 45% of bidders were SMEs2,
?  Determining segments of the entire group:
?  49%: investment -construction,
?  17%: products (within products: healthcare products: 21 %, IT products: 28 %),
?  34%: services (within services: construction: 35%, public utility companies: 20%).
In order to thoroughly elaborate the topic, we considered it important to clarify, in a separate
paper3, the general, particular and individual levels of corruption as well as the specific
features of its development in time.
Corruption, in its general form of appearance, is a continuously changing social
phenomenon, a given product of the social and economic environment, with its characteristic
proportions and time horizon determined by the pace, nature and extent of imminent changes.
It must be also added that, in terms of its existence and typical features, corruption - just as
crime - reflects the basic features and contradictions of society, actively forming/deforming
the development of the system of social and economic integrity. Corruption, as a mass
phenomenon, possesses all the features of social mass phenomena and first of all,
forms/deforms the distribution system of society. Therefore, the basic feature of corruption on
the society level is that it plays a role of secondary redistribution, preventing the planned
functioning of the rules of distribution, either with respect to its
?  extent,
?  method or
?  beneficiaries.
Another important criterion of corruption is that it also affects the non-pecuniary
distribution/redistribution relations of society. By this we mean that although corruption
strongly influences the trends of economic relations, at the same time, it also brings about, on
both macro and micro levels, powerful changes in various fields of social and economic
relations such as morals and ethics, culture, science, ideology, politics or family.
The particular level that links mass and individual level corruption phenomena is
characterised by a uniquely positioned circle possessing identical sets of habits, traditions and
values. By being a member of this circle, the members of the group possessing a unique social
status can be both corrupted and are also corrupt.
It can be established that, in its general form of appearance, corruption is a social mass
phenomenon, whereas, in its individual form, it is a unique social relation. It seems that it
can be considered a historic rule of legislation that a prevailing legislation will select a
segment from the entire phenomenon of corruption and persecute it using the methods of
criminal law. The extent of these segments changes from time to time but is never of minor
significance; which indicates that the above-mentioned phenomena have already trespassed
the border of social danger currently determined by criminal law. Relating to the penal law:
as a case of corruption, the following offences are listed as a crime against the clean morals of
public life: bribery of officials, economic bribery, fraudulent misuse of funds, influence
peddling.
                                               
2 In 2002-ben the highest value of tendering – in practice of the Hungarian public procurements - had the –
investment-construction (49%) and the highest number of succefull tenders the healthcare products. In the
centralised public procurement the highest value (62,5%) was represented by IT products. Therefore the previous
three groups of bidders were surveyed by FME during the research process.
3 Survey on the roots of corruption in Hungary prior to and following the social and economic transformation,
Foundation for Market Economy, Budapest, May 2003
61 Development of the Hungarian public procurement practice
1.1 The development of public procurement in numbers
The importance of public procurement market in Hungary has been growing continuously:
?  the value of public procurements has raised from HUF 100 billion in 1996 to 800
billion (3,3 billion €) in 2002;
?  in 2002 about 1/5 of the budget expenditure was realised by public procurement;
?  nearly 80% of all 4,242 procedures were open bids, 20% were contracted through
negotiations in 2002;
?  concerning the subject of tenders: 60% of them were construction investments, 25%
were made as product purchase and 15% included services in 2002.
Both the proportion of municipalities and its institutions, moreover budgetary organs and their
institutions have risen (by fourfold and ninefold) recently. Also, opportunities for SMEs to
obtain public procurement orders have widened (47%).
Both the number and value of the procedures completed by budgetary organs and their
institutions, moreover municipalities and its institutions altogether are determinant; their
total proportion in number and in value reached and exceeded 70% in 2002. (see the next
table)
Number and value of the public procurement procedures
by types of parties inviting bids
Types of parties inviting bids Number of
procedures
from
01.11.1995 to
31.12.1996
Value of
procedures
from
01.11.1995 to
31.12.1996
Number of
procedures
from
01.01.2002 to
31.12.2002
Value of
procedures
from
01.01.2002 to
31.12.2002
Pieces ‘000 HUF Pieces ‘000 HUF
Budgetary organs and their
institutions
661 39,1 1092 349,2
Municipalities and their
institutions
1.692 55,1 1.857 249,5
Public utility companies 762 51,0 481 98,6
Pension and Health Insurance
Agencies
n.a. n.a. 46 11,4
Public bodies and foundations n.a. n.a. 184 13,6
Subsidized organisations n.a. n.a 246 30,5
Other purchasing institutions 126 4,1 337 51,8
Total 3.241 149,4 4.243 804,6
Source: Public Procurement Database
Municipalities and its institutions represent the highest proportion (43,8%) in number
of the procedures, followed by budgetary organs and their institutions (25,7%) and public
utility companies (11,3%).
Concerning the procedures in value, budgetary organs and their institution’s value was
doubled compared to 2001, due to motorway buildings. Their proportion therefore reached
43%, exceeding municipalities’ (31%) and public utility companies’ (12,3%) ratio.
The total value of public utility companies’ procedures was reduced by 10% in 2002
compared to the previous year, their proportion has been decreasing year by year. By
7reviewing a more detailed statistics of public procurement, it cannot be excluded that some of
these companies purchase by neglecting the Act. The solution of this problem is extremely
important and urgent, as they are also bodies under the force of EU public procurement. As a
result, the Council for Public Procurement appealed to them in writing in order to make their
practice clear.
With regard to the object of the public procurement procedures, construction investments
represent the biggest part both in number (45,3%) and in value (60%). Product purchase
reached 25%, services 15% in value in 2002.
Regionally, Budapest - with most of the parties inviting a tender - has the greatest
proportion both in number and in value, which were also increased last year, similarly to
previous years. They initiated 2126 procedures (50% of the total) in the value of HUF 516
billion (64% of the total value).
The total turnover of the centralised procurement based on general contracts was HUF 82,6
billion in 2002, which was higher by 29% than the 2001 one (HUF 58,5 billion), and
represented 10,3% of the total value of public procurement in Hungary.
The support of SME development and also their appearance in the public procurement market
has a great importance not only from the domestic point of view, but from EU integration.
SMEs were successful in 2788 public procurement procedures in 2002 (65% of the total
procedures), in the value of HUF 376,5 billion (46,8% of the total value).4 Their
participation in such procedures has been favourably effected by the increasing number of
open procedures in Hungary (SMEs won 66% of the number, and 34% of the value of the
open procedures in 2002.)
1.2 Anti-corruption legislation regarding the public procurement
In compliance with the obligations undertaken in the Accession Partnership signed in 1999
Hungarian government approved a decree (1023/2001 (III.14) concerning the national
strategy against corruption in March 2001. Its main items are prevention and control, as
well as changing public opinion, transparency of decision making and the freedom of press.
In May 2002 the new government in power announced a program on transparency in
public life, one of its principal goals being to eliminate corruption. Several anti-corruption
measures were taken – among them supporting the establishment of investigating boards,
strengthening the role of Governmental Supervisory Office (KEHI) to reveal corruption cases
on the one hand, and to narrow the possibilities for corruption through presenting new bills,
enhanced controlling of civil servants or approving the so called glass-pocket bill on the other
hand. According to the government decree containing regulation concepts for managing
public finance and on the transparency of the usage of public property and its strict controlling
launched in 2002 the level of corruption can be reduced first of all by modification of laws.
The measures taken between 1998-2002 were aimed entirely to prevent even the
possibility of corruption and to raise penalty level of corruption cases in the sphere of
civil service. The government has made serious steps in implementing this strategy. As the
main legal step Public Procurement Act was modified, the bill on property claim for civil
servants was elaborated and bribery was listed as higher penalty crime.
                                               
4 An advance can be observed both in number and value of procedures won by SMEs compared to 2001, though
the proportion in value was smaller (59%) than in 2001 - due to the significant value of motorway building
which was done by bigger companies.
8From July 2002 a political secretary of public finance subordinated to prime minister was
nominated to be responsible for supervising systems of managing and using public monies.
His duty – according to the requirements of transparency, controllability fair public life – is to
harmonize the systems supervising public finance and elaborate initiatives and proposals for
further development of these systems. The office of the secretary has a position of a kind of
ombudsman for public finance in the governmental system.
The European Union accession procedure includes the objectives of law harmonization in
some areas – not necessarily concerning anti-corruption policy:
?  public procurement (reforming procedures, defining threshold values),
?  reforming civil service (increasing the number of staff, professional quality and
income),
?  strict state control and auditing (directives, creating independent in-company
controlling systems, increasing capacity in number of staff and information
technology)
?  reforming court activities (the independence of judges and the increasing efficiency of
legal judgment system).
The elements of law harmonization program stated in the government decree already being
realized are the following:
?  modification of act on lawyers;
?  modification of some of the laws concerning consumer protection;
?  publishing the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of Council of Europe (CE).
Important step forward against corruption was the so called “glass pocket” legal package
approved unanimously by the Parliament in April 20035. This is the first system of
regulations, which fights against corruption through economic measures instead of by
means of criminal law. The coherent legal package modifying 19 laws in full harmonization
with the EU requirements – among them the one on SAO, the public finances, on the Civil
Code, the economic organizations, the company registry, data protection, local authorities –
aims to inform citizens and to make management of public finance more transparent and
extend control over them.
1.3 Regulatory system and operation conditions of public procurement
procedures
The Act of 1995 XL regulating the public procurement process was passed by the Parliament
on May 9, 1995, and came into force on November 1, 1995. At the same time, the central state
agencies of public procurement came into being: the Council for Public Procurement and the
Public Procurement Arbitration Committee.
The legal institution of public procurement was introduced into the Hungarian legal
system, on the one hand, with the end to render the utilization of central funds more
transparent, and, on the other hand, to make it more efficient. The legislature
fundamentally considered the legal material in force in the European Union as a basis, in
order to fulfil Hungary’s harmonisation requirement – in the framework of the Accession
                                               
5 XXIV/2003 Act on Modification of Regulations Concerning the Management of Public Finance, the Publicity
and Transparency of Managing Common Property
9Agreement -, in accordance with relevant guidelines.
In compliance with the Act, state and municipality agencies and their institutions, the Pension
and Health Insurance Agencies, public bodies and public foundations are obliged to act in
conformity with the rules of this Act in the course of their procurement of goods, building
projects and the ordering of services.
Certain special procedures do not fall within the Act of public procurement (i.e. purchasing of
international organisations or purchasing defined in international contracts, special tactical
purchase of assets, purchase under agricultural regulation, purchase of water and fuels). Also,
services that can only be provided by certain person or organisation defined in a regulation,
central bank and banking operation, sale of securities, broadcasters’ programme-making, R+D
activity (with the exception when it is half-financed and utilized by a public entity), moreover
plans of resettlement, construction authorization and execution plans of investments do not
come under the ruling either.
The value limits of public procurement are determined each year in the annual Budget Act,
and so far limits have been raised annually in each procurement category compared to the
starting year (in real value by approx. 70 per cent).
The supreme supervisory agencies of the public procurement process are the following two
organisations: Council for Public Procurement6 and the Public Procurement Arbitration
Committee7 set up by the Council.
The agencies responsible for thematic and overall controlling of the public procurement
procedures are the State Audit Office (SAO) and the Government Control Office (GCO).
The State Audit Office (SAO), established according to the Act of 1989 XXXVIII, as the
state’s main financial and economic supervisory body is obliged to report to the parliament. It
controls the closing of the state, the Pension Fund and 3200 local municipalities budget
yearly. It has also been able to control private companies related to state organisations since
the approval of the transparency law in May 2003. Though SAO has wide legal authority and
also access to trade and bank secret, it is not an authority therefore cannot take correction
measures. The Government Control Office (GCO) – based on the Public Procurement Act –
                                               
6 The Council, consisting of 19 members representing central government officials, contracting authorities, and
bidders keeps track of the enforcement of the rules of the law. It initiates and reviews the amendments to the
legal rules relating to public procurement, keeps track of the performance of the contracts concluded on the basis
of public procurement procedures, and provides for the fulfilment of various other administrative
responsibilities. It falls within the competence of the Council to conduct the proceedings instituted on grounds of
the unlawful omission of public procurement procedures and related to the violation of the fundamental
principles and rules of the public procurement process.. The Council draws up a report for the Parliament
annually on its own activity, and on its experiences relating to the fairness and transparency of public
procurement.
7 Within the Council there is the Public Procurement Arbitration Committee consisting of 18 members
responsible for providing legal redress in case of disputes or violation of the Act of Public Procurement. The
Council cannot provide the Committee with professional instructions. The Committee may, as a sanction, order
the suspension of a public procurement procedure, may prohibit conclusion of a contract not yet concluded, or
may order involvement of the applicant in the procedure. At the interested parties’ request, the Committee
conducts an open session at which the parties may make comments and may present their evidence. In the case
of the disclosure of erroneous or false data, the concealment of material information or refusal to disclose such
information, the Committee may impose a fine. Review of a resolution of the Committee may be requested of a
court. The cases launched (less than 10 per year) due to omitting public procurement are only the part of the 7-
800 requests for legal redress annually. It is the municipalities that have most of the legal redress procedures
against the decisions of the purchasing institutions. The main reasons for legal redress are decisions concerning
participation of enterprises and selection of the awarded one.
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is entitled to control the government’s expenditure financed by the central budget and state
funds. GCO reports directly to the government. It also examines the effectiveness of non-
profit state organisations and practicability of purchases by so-called performance
effectiveness tests, moreover makes proposals for the government. It is not an authority
therefore cannot judge or penalize. GCO makes approx. one third of the auditing for the prime
minister’s request. Besides, it also checks realization of international aid programmes such as
EU subsidies.
Amendments of the Public Procurement Act
The Act has been modified several times since then, though these were only smaller
changes. The amendments covered both the subjects and the objects of the Act, the sphere of
the organisations was widened and the definition of the subject of public procurement and
centralised procurement procedures was made more exact.
Besides the slightest changes, the overall amendment of the Act was carried out after a four-
year period of operation and controlling on September 1, 1999. Though the changes8 effected
almost every articles of the Act, it did not result a new Act but only the renewal of the legal
material in force, reflecting the validity and authenticity of the Act’s regulatory principles
regarding also EU harmonisation. The amendments intended to keep back the evasion of the
Act by introducing stricter provisions, and at the same time, to keep the rules in by making
provisions more flexible.
The new comprehensive modification of the Act is still expected from January 1 and/or
May 1, 2004, one of the important elements of which is the minimizing of the sphere of
exceptions therefore decreasing corruption possibilities and neglect of the Act. The draft is
also aiming at strengthening the already existing supervisory bodies by certain tools such as
the Council for Public Procurement’s recommendation for ‘unreal undertaking’, which
obligates the parties inviting a tender to sort out unfeasible offers.
There are several new EU directives appearing in the draft such as reconciliation, which does
not really work properly in the EU either, and certification, in the course of which an
independent, accredited body certifies the legal compliance of the public procurement
procedures of the party inviting a tender. It is important that EU regulations will be built into
the actual Hungarian rules. The procedures reaching the EU limit compose a separate chapter
in the structure of the new Act and are totally harmonizing with EU law. The limit alters
according to procurement types. This chapter comes into force on the day of the accession. If
the value of the procurement reaches the EU limit, the procedure should be published for EU
countries as well. (The EU limits are significantly higher than the Hungarian ones.)
Also, all the parties inviting a tender are obliged to make a yearly public procurement plan
until the end of the first quarter of the year despite the fact that especially municipalities are
not aware of the amounts available in time.
2 The nature of public procurement
2.1 Changes in the scope of the Act on Public Procurement (corruption
                                               
8 One of these was the support of SMEs’ access to public procurement procedures.
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front door)
Openness in public procurement is clearly ensured if procurements made by institutions are
carried out in accordance with the order of public procurement procedures as required by law.
If procurements are removed from under the force of the PPA, the opportunity considered by
the public as a „corruption front door” opens up.
We will now list the factors that may influence the spreading of procurements conducted as
part of public procurement procedures at a slower pace and in a more contradictory manner
than desirable:
?  Preparedness of those applying the law, staff shortage, problems pertaining to
interpretation and approach;
?  Contradictions of other provisions pertaining to the regulations on budget financing,
special issues related to practical solutions,
?  Successful assertion of group interests in excluding the public and regarding
transparency.
Further to the practice of the last three years and the findings of the in-depth interviews, it can
be ascertained that we have found examples of all the above-mentioned factors pertaining to
the exclusion of procurements financed from public funds from the scope of the Act on Public
Procurement.
2.1.1 Preparedness of those applying the law, headcount shortage, problems related to
interpretation and approach
The PPA sanctions errors arising during public procurement procedures, however, failure to
conduct a public procurement procedure is basically not checked by any institution, with
the exception of the thematic inspections of the State Audit Office. The Act does not provide
a detailed list of the institutions subject to its scope, thus some institutions may try to evade it.
No organisation is in charge of monitoring the failure to conduct public procurements; there is
no such organisation that possesses the power or the apparatus to investigate such failures.
Missing legislation in respect of managing material expenditures. The Act focuses on
investments reaching a certain value limit, however, no organisation monitors what happens
to material expenditures that may reach as much as 75 % of the budget of a ministry or state
organ. Also, investments made with the purpose of development are not monitored, either.
Thus, there is also a chance for corruption here. Although these are minor items on their own,
they will be significant in total. (This is why extending the scope of the PPA to procurements
under national value limits (HUF 10 millions) through the amendment thereof is of major
importance).
There are also problems of harmonisation between the laws; for example, several provisions
of the Act on Concessions are conflicting with those of the PPA, which ought to be changed.
There are differences in the interpretation of the PPA, i.e., who is subject to its scope.
Often, the legal status of an institution is not identified, thus the institutions themselves do not
know whether or not they fall within the scope of centralised public procurement and the Act
fails to provide a detailed list of the organisations subject to its scope. This entails the
possibility that an organisation that should conduct a public procurement procedure fails to
proceed in accordance with provisions of the Act (possibly through no fault of its own).
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However, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive list of all the organisations that will use
public funds in one way or another in the future, or of those whose activities are under the
controlling influence, either directly or indirectly, of any organisation within the scope of the
state budget. The legislator may, at any time, establish sui generis subjects-at-law and legal
entities of a new type, the consequence of which may be that if the Act fails to include a new
subject-at-law in its itemised list, the given organ will not be under the obligation to apply the
provisions of the Act.
2.1.2 Contradictions lying within other requirements pertaining to the regulation of
budget financing; special problems arising with practical solutions
Experiences drawn from the surveys, carried out by the State Audit Office and also by
Foundation for Market Economy, indicate that several problems arise from the contradictions
of other provisions relating to the regulation of budget financing and from special problems
pertaining to practical solutions, such as the lack of synchronisation or certain limitations of
settlement etc.
These problems affect local governments and healthcare in the first place, however, thanks to
changes regularly taking place in the institutional system and as a higher level of co-
ordination is achieved, the situation is continuously improving.
As regards the planning of, and preparations for, public procurement procedures, the lack of
budgetary funds remains a serious problem. Another problem is that decisions on
procurements must be taken based on insufficient information concerning the size of the
available budgetary funds, as such information is made available only at a later stage.
Although it is not mandatory to actually implement the purchases announced, however, in this
case, conducting preliminary evaluations will be in vain.
2.1.3 Successful assertion of group interests in excluding openness and transparency
In this area we find, among other things, several organisations, in respect of which the
legislators were too late to realize that they should have been made subject to the scope of the
Act on Public Procurements. Examples are the State Privatisation and Holding Company,
the Hungarian Bank for Development and the State Motorway Management Corporation, this
latter one still being a “freelancer” in our knowledge.
Our survey has found that bidders are rather indignant that, for a long time, the possibility for
evading the law existed for certain organisations (ministries, local governments) e.g. through
having businesses supervised by them carry out public procurement procedures.
The problems of exemptions based on legal authorisations aimed at the circumvention of
public procurement procedures and on “skilful” circumvention are, in general, irritating and
are hard to explain. Of course, not all acts of circumvention are part of the “circle of
scandals” but this requires the ability to differentiate, on the basis of careful analyses,
between problems brought about by development problems, efficiency requirements and
economic necessities.
An example to the last above-mentioned category is the release from public procurement,
pursuant to Government Decree No. 290/2002 27th December), of plants and enterprises
receiving agricultural support. The reasons that can be provided include the limited ability to
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bear administrative burdens of small- and medium size enterprises operating in this field as
well as time limitations springing from the ‘biological nature’ of this business. In principle,
this exemption will cease to exist as of May 2004, although there is no knowing as to how the
date of Hungary’s joining the EU resolves the basic roots of the problem.
In summary, it can be ascertained that, in a successful assertion of group interests to evade
the rules of public procurement it also play a fundamental role: Public morals / public culture
do not carry an anti-corruption conduct in a wide, society-level sense.
Our former findings, in our world progressing on the road towards globalisation, are valid
also beyond country boundaries.
2.2 Evaluation of ensuring equal opportunities, transparency and clarity
in public procurement (analysing further corruption back doors)
The basic principle regarding equal opportunities of the PPA is realised in that it moves a
larger group of entrepreneurs, however, only properly qualified companies of an appropriate
size are fit for works of a certain dimension. Smaller companies lack the apparatus required
for bidding and can first of all act in the public procurement market as a subcontractor.
When determining eligibility criteria, requirements are sometimes tailored to a certain
company as it can be questioned as to why e.g. the institution inviting bids considers
acceptable deliveries made within exactly ten days? There may be only one enterprise that can
fulfil this requirement. The Act does not contain any obligation to provide an explanation for
setting such criteria, therefore, the consideration of such unique, subjective factors cannot be
eliminated.
As regards the set of aspects further to which bids are evaluated, it is a rather sensitive,
product- and service-dependent issue. When evaluating the bids submitted by the individual
organisations, in principle, it is easy to agree that the best bid is not necessarily the one with
the lowest price. The Public Procurement Act does not set forth the principle of value-
proportionate results; the entity inviting bids may decide at its discretion as to what to take
into consideration. At the same time, this freedom also provides opportunities for background
agreements prior to determining bidding criteria.
The transparency and clarity of public procurements can only be ensured by guarantees of
openness. In our survey, we examined corruption risks occurring during the preparation of
bids or while issuing invitations for bids and also during the decision-making process.
2.2.1 Problems pertaining to the announcement of public procurement procedures
It is a general opinion formulated by bidders that bids are not announced on the basis of
proper expertise and, as a result, are not announced precisely. Institutions inviting tenders in
the IT area are often unable to determine their needs precisely.  As a consequence, bidders
will become exposed.
Companies submitting bids noted that they will only participate in a bid if it is „unlikely” that
such bid is „tailored to” a certain company.  All of the bidders we asked have encountered this
problem. Technical criteria are very often determined in a way that only a single company can
fulfil them.
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In general, bidders may receive information about the current bidding opportunities from the
Public Procurement Bulletin. At the same time, distributors of healthcare products and
certain IT companies receive preliminary information from their customers and partners about
the tenders to be announced. What is more, some of them even said that obtaining information
on tenders forms an organic part of their customer relations or marketing activities. Good
customer relations are also useful in receiving information (e.g. during a working lunch) about
other details of tenders (such as the amount available for implementing a project).
There are several ways according to the  practice of local governments to evade the Public
Procurement Act, while such evasions are either initiated by institutions or enterprises. Most
often the case is that the body considers the criterion of „the most favourable bid overall”
instead of the aspect of „the lowest price”, which offers ample room for announcing and
assessing tenders in a subjective manner. Attempts are also made to influence certain
announcements or decisions for political reasons. In relation to the above, we heard a number of
times that the representatives of so many parties are present in public procurement committees
that this fact in itself ensures a balance.
Companies submitting bids to local governments attempt to evade the lawfulness of public
procurement procedures using several methods: by formulating prices further to public
financial budgets and through a consequential division of the market among themselves
(construction enterprises, architects).
Often a subcontractor that has entered into a contract is changed at a later point in time.
Reviewing such a switch is so time-consuming and complicated for local governments that they
prefer to leave such issues untouched.
There are no unified regulations existing in the area of quality assurance – there are no
regulations relating to institutions inviting tenders, whereas there are certain, rather broad
regulations for bidders.
2.2.2 Problems in resolution/evaluation process
As regards form, tenders are evaluated based on the set of evaluation criteria. Nevertheless, it
is still a frequent problem that bidders are unable to meet requirements regarding form.
(Approximately 20-40 percent of all the efforts made in compiling a tender will be dedicated
to the substantial part, whereas 60-80 percent on meeting formal requirements). Unreasonably
strict formal requirements may raise the doubt on the part of bidders that the company inviting
tenders intends to restrict the number of participants for formal inappropriateness. Bidders
also complained that opportunities for completing omissions are also not regulated in a
uniform manner and that exclusions are often made on such grounds.
In most cases, companies inviting tenders will select an offer that is most favourable
altogether and not the one that is value proportionate or offers the lowest price. This is
occasionally ensured by setting unreal criteria (deadline penalty, warranties), which facilitates
more „flexible” evaluation.
Although tenders are mostly evaluated according to the criteria set forth in the call for tenders,
it sometimes occurs that bids are evaluated using weightings other than previously
indicated (pharmaceutical tenders). The evaluation will be subjective despite that fact that,
in almost every case, it is carried out on the basis of scores.  Another problem is that between
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0 and 10 scores no distinction is made in terms of the various criteria and the respective
weights of the various criteria are not always determined.
Undertaking disproportionate commitments may result in maximum partial points,
which presents a realistic opportunity for winning the tender. As regards construction
investments, certain bidders tend to leave out certain items from their offers to make them
look somewhat cheaper than others. However, the implementation of such tenders will later
involve additional costs.
The proposed amendment of the PPA may present a significant step forward in handling
unfounded commitments. Considering competition in the market of public procurements, at
times bidders undertake commitments that interfere with fair competition, violate generally
accepted professional practices, rules of ethics (unfounded content elements of the bid such as
prices too low or, in a manner fit for humour magazines, a warranty for 700 years) to ensure
that the entity inviting tenders awards these sections the maximum number of scores. The
proposed amendment of the PPA intends to handle this issue by providing that institutions
inviting tenders must ascertain the splidity and feasibility of such content elements of tenders
that look unreal and impossible to fulfil. Inappropriate explanation may also result in
exclusion. However, what do we consider appropriate explanation? If executing the above-
mentioned public procurement at an unreal price may, as a reference, generate significant
assignments for the bidder at a later date, a low price as a good investment may produce
multiple returns. Thus, from the bidder’s point of view, this is a great deal that should not be
disapproved of. Who should the law protect; can it be regulated at all? Is there a need for
regulation? The PPA only mentions requests for explanations but does not deal with the
future course thereof, as to when, under what circumstances can an explanation be accepted?
The Act cannot solve the problem of resolving issues requiring immediate action. Our
interviewees also mentioned a problem, namely that government operation also requires fast,
ad hoc reactions, which this system is not capable of. The Act handles public procurements
relating to advisory services, PR activities and event organisation with difficulties. As regards
event organisation, e.g. only the price and other factors that can be expressed in numbers will
count; the quality of the programme is a criterion that is difficult to measure and evaluate
further to the bid. This issue is not and cannot be regulated by the Act.
In summary, it can be established that compliance with the Act in itself will not eliminate
corruption. Intentions relating to corruption will either diminish or there will be less reason
for corruption if an appropriate market balance exists in one form or another. Thus, the
question is whether or not those carrying out procurement activities possess an appropriate
knowledge of the market and for what purpose and how reasonably public funds are used as
the PPA only includes provisions on how to use such public funds.
It was a common view of both those inviting and submitting bids that an opportunity for
corruption only occurs when determining the professional criteria and upon possible
leakage of information. In all other occurrences, corruption will result in a violation of the
law, which, in most cases, will become known almost immediately. Therefore, the opinion is
that the call for bids, with special emphasis on its professional section, must be extremely
specific and clear as regards wording. Meeting the technical parameters set forth in the call
for tender is mandatory.
As regards corruption, the area with the most room for attacks is the invitation itself and its
professional section. The reason is that any violation of the law is extremely difficult to detect
in this area and once it occurs it cannot be grasped. At the same time, it is a conviction that
corruption cannot be eliminated; and neither the Public Procurement Arbitration Committee
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nor the various sanctions or threats are able to detect or even prove any possible pooling of
interests existing in the area of public procurements. The task is not the above; it is much
rather bringing about circumstances where there is less reason for corrupting anyone over
the course of a public procurement procedure. Tax evasion is a good comparison as again, the
solution for tax evasion is not having a tax inspector stand behind every citizen but bringing
about circumstances where there is no reason for fraud.
2.2.3 Evaluation of audits, controls of the public procurement process
Public procurement procedures are audited and verified by the internal audit units of
organisations inviting bids, by the thematic audits of the State Audit Office (1997, 2001), and,
in the case of legal remedies, by the Public Procurement Arbitration Committee (PPAC). The
audits are usually confined to verifying the regulatory compliance of the procedures and
usually find all formal elements in order. However, performance of the contracts concluded
pursuant to the public procurement procedure is not audited!
The State Audit Office9 carried out its first public procurement audit in 1997. In the first
stage of this audit, central budgetary organisations and their institutions, as well as earmarked
public funds were reviewed, while the 2nd stage focused on the public procurements of local
governments and their affiliated institutions. The audits of 1997 year have established that due
to deficiencies partly on the regulatory and partly on the law enforcement side, public
procurement procedures have not been integrated into the budgetary administration
system. Legal provisions were regarded to be unnecessary limitations, whose formal
implementation was attempted, with varying success, but its role in the organisation and
success of economic administration was not recognised. However, some of the shortcomings
revealed in the process of implementation could be traced back to the regulatory and
interpretation-related issues of the law. On numerous occasions, legal provisions were
circumvented and ignored, which was made possible by unclear legislation in several areas.
And centralised public procurement procedures were still not assessable due to the delay and
shortcomings of Government-level regulation.
A general finding of the audits conducted in 2000 was that certain ministries and local
governments were more compliant with the stipulations of Act XL of 1995 on Public
Procurement. The explanatory stipulations included in the amended Public Procurement Act
(clarification of its objective scope, procurements for the same objects), the changes aimed at
simplifying the procedures and making the procedural rules easier to apply (shortening of
procedures, reducing the number of written confirmations required) and stricter requirements
(terms and conditions of bids contracted through negotiation, publishing assessment criteria,
extending the scope of legal redress procedures) served well the implementation of the Act’s
core principles (clarity of competition, publicity and providing equal opportunities to all).
However, the SAO report for the year 2000 also sets out that
?  Frequently, there were still procurements where the PPA was circumvented; and
violations of the Act also occurred, either due to various, knowingly adopted
individual interpretations of the law, or “simple”, spontaneous violations of the law
due to a lack of knowledge; which can be traced back primarily to attitude problems.
?  Organisations subject to the Act’s scope still viewed public procurements as a bunch
of liabilities resulting in unnecessary limitations making the applicable procedures
                                               
 9 The State Audit Office is the most senior central budgetary audit organisation, reporting directly to the
Parliament.
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more difficult, rather than as a set of procedures allowing the economical utilisation of
public funds, that can rise up to the challenge of public competition.
?  The majority of local governments have not realised that their wide-ranging liberties
also place an enormous liability on them when it comes to the utilisation of public
funds, and what major help a proper public procurement exercise can be in this.
?  It also did not help the organisations to recognise the significance of applying the
law, that circumventing the PPA; i.e. the partial or complete by-passing of public
procurements, do not threaten them enough to ensure an increase in the number
and value of public procurements and the observance of relevant regulations.10
?  Within the organisations where the attitude to public procurements has changed
favourably, the appropriate organisational framework of public procurement has been
established and the enforcement of the law has also improved throughout the
implementation of the procedures.
Central budgetary organisations requesting the bids (ministries) think that public
procurement procedures are adequately controlled. Based on the currently applied
method, the procurement itself is not conducted by the same entity as the one using the
purchased good, therefore there should be no reason to suspect corruption. In theory, it is
possible to corrupt certain members of the committee, yet, such act of corruption could be
easily discovered by the auditing organisations. The internal audit function is also provided in
all organisations. They also meet the criteria of conflict of interest. From time to time, they
request a statement (by an external expert), but internal regulations also do provide details
pertaining to their responsibility. Details are also checked in the company registry, meaning
that the audit covers the verification of the basics.
Bidders consider it important that the PPA provides for legal remedy through the Public
Procurement Arbitration Committee. Mainly when such an option is a real need: certain
construction companies tend to receive the tender opening protocol on the last day stipulated
by the law – in the case of projects where the probability of seeking legal remedy is high.
Taking into consideration the time available to seek legal remedy, there is often not enough
time left.
At the same time, the majority of the bidders have the experience that it is not always
worth attacking a procedure because such action might have a boomerang effect later on
onto the bidder – and they do not want to jeopardise the good client-supplier relationship.
Therefore many share the view that it is worthless lodging complaints and initiate law suites.
Civil litigation procedures tend to be particularly time consuming with results unpredictable.
In some cases, we also found different opinions. During the investigation by the PPAC, in
order to ensure uninterrupted supply, the previous public procurement contract remains in
effect through a prolongation, which favours the previously contacted supplier. We have
found cases where the former supplier attacked the new procedure for that very reason.
3 Overview of findings and recommendations
In the course of our survey – mainly through the process of the interviews and when
formulating our opinion – we paid utmost attention to maintaining the fragile equilibrium we
                                               
10 Ignoring the public procurement obligation had especially light consequences in terms of the procurement of
goods and services, as, due to a lack of appropriate controlling mechanisms, the budgetary and public
procurement information system was not very likely to expose violations of the law and any unjustified
modifications to the contract, and, consequently, result in sanctions.
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managed to establish when analysing individual cases, because we examined the nature of
corruption affecting public procurement through the operation of unique social relationships
with a multitude of players. We hope that we managed to summarise the meaningful and
generic opinions and succeeded in screening the biased tone of individual assessments.
3.1 Efficiency of public procurement from the point of corruption
and/or savings in public money
Considering the fact that the introduction of the legal institution of public procurement into
the Hungarian legal system was prompted on the one hand by the intention to make the
utilisation of public funds more transparent and, on the other hand, render such utilisation
more efficient, we deemed it important to assess, on the basis of the experiences gathered
through the survey, the current status of efficiency.
According to recent international estimates: in Asian region the costs of public procurements
are 20% higher as it could be reasonable and in the South America 11% of budgetary
expenditures are spent of illegal purposes. 11 There are also some European estimations that
bidders are supposed to be “ready to pay back” to officials from 5 to 10% (or more) of the
public procurement values in course of some construction investments. In Hungary there are
some estimations delivered at different conferences by representatives of TIHUN and of the
Hungarian Society of Public Procurement as follows: about 3% of the public procurement
value (it is HUF 23 to 25 billions in 2003).
The degree of savings that may be achieved through public procurement is a rather
controversial issue. No accurate report has ever been produced in that respect, neither by the
foreign nor by Hungarian experts. We do not know the volume of savings originated from
lower prices in course of public procurement by reducing corruption. The public procurement
market is continuously growing and competition is also getting stronger.12. Savings can also
be realised indirectly, thanks to the transparency of public procurement procedures. This is
so because an open procedure ensuring fair competition can mitigate the risk of corruption
and the related expenses, which, ultimately, contributes to a careful utilisation of public funds.
The position can be questioned according to which public procurement regulation presumes
the efficiency thereof, i.e., the savings that can be realised through its application are higher
than the costs associated with the implementation of the formal procedures.
In course of the survey there were numerous opinions reflecting to the dangers of excessive
bureaucracy introduced in order to reduce to corruption risk. Many believe that the public
procurement procedure is overburdened by administrative elements. By this, they mean
that a lot more records and various application forms must be obtained and kept, which, on
occasion, do not facilitate the procurement activity or are related to it only remotely. They
have also indicated as a problem that the authorities issuing certain certificates are not always
prepared to enforce the law.
                                               
11 Source: Gusztáv Báger, Árpád Kovács, Balázs Kurucsai, János Lévai: Fight against corruption through
introducing the operation of SAO, State Audit Office, Budapest, October 2002, page 6.
12 For example, in Hungary in 2002, 8.3 bids were received for one public procurement procedure as opposed to
5.4 in 2001 (Source: Council of Public Procurement data).
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The inflexibility of the public procurement procedure is also causing problems mainly for
investments whose market is changing rapidly (such as in the area of information technology).
It is difficult to apply the PPA currently in force in these areas and the success of the
procedure is questionable. Procurements realised through such procedures will not yield the
best, up-to-date and cheap offers as such process is time consuming and the requirements of
the tender rapidly become obsolete. The opinion expressed by the bidders interviewed was
fairly uniform: the price is not cheaper and quality is not guaranteed either.
The efficiency of public procurements conducted by local governments is also
challenged. Despite the fact that some of the respondents considered public procurement as
being clearly cheaper, guaranteeing better quality, many said that public procurement does
not create real competition between companies and has even a price inflating effect
because the publicity of framework amounts in the budget and the co-operation of businesses
result in a price cartel.
Summarizing the results of FME’s survey we can verify the following in terms of
efficiency of the public procurements from the point of corruption and savings.
?  Application of equal treatment resulting equal chances is a core principle both in
democracies and in developed formations of integration. It entails the following three
major requirements on the basis of which one can fight against corruption:
?  Legality,
?  Fairness and
?  Economic rationality.
Legality means correct legislation being enable to operate without retrospective changes. It is
ensured by proper amendments of the act in terms of the public procurements and that of the
whole anticorruption regulation in Hungary.
?  Fairness has to be strengthen by developing business culture, business ethics and
anticorruption efforts in the whole transition region including Hungary.
As we have seen before, in terms of economic rationality there are some more deficits in the
public procurement procedures from the point of the administrative overburden in Hungary
yet. However we should not forget that combating corruption is a part of the cost of building a
new democracy. The indirect advantages of decreasing the corruption risk might be realized
through transparency, openness and more equal chances of businesses and the civil sphere.
3.2 Conclusions, recommendations
It can be regarded as a general opinion, that the relevant regulations and the expected
modifications thereof are adequate in terms of mitigating the risk of corruption to a
significant extent. Yet, it is impossible to fully eliminate abuses only through administrative
measures. A change in attitude and a different approach is required to prevent corruption.
Intertwining of interests may not be excluded nor can the maintenance of information contacts
or the leaking of information during the preparations phase be done away with.
Although the basic concept of the PPA is good (spend public funds sparingly and ensure
openness), corruption may not be fully excluded nor eradicated through any law. Any law
may be circumvented; it is only a question of intention. Yet, the PPA does make the
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unscrupulous ‘handing’ of deals more difficult. Honest intentions and fair attitude may
mitigate the risk of corruption. In order to attain this, we need to create an anti-corruption
culture achievable only through the strengthening of public ethics, better level of professional
preparedness of both the bidders and the institutions inviting tenders thorough market
knowledge, and by „reinforcing public procurement marketing efforts”.
At the same time, another question arises: should we treat a well functioning partner
relationship as corruption, a partner relationship which is characterised by continuous
communication in order to best meet the needs of the client? Should we suspect corruption
when the client is invited to a professional event, or when the known supplier consults the
client on the occasion of a tender? An issue specific to public procurement is that the public
procurement procedure makes it difficult or does not even allow the development of
longstanding relationships. Co-operation built on a longstanding relationship would be of
special importance in the area of services, especially when it comes to higher quality services,
as a service provider must practically ‘learn’ the environment and the specifics thereof and the
subjects for whom the services are rendered. Since this is converse to the wording of the
regulation, the interactive co-operation of the parties may be approached from the practical
aspect only and may be solved only informally.
The Act on lobbying is also missing, which, if well formulated, could be a supporting force
in that matter and the public opinion would not confuse lobbying with corruption. In the
opinion of the experts on the subject, unfortunately today it is still difficult to differentiate
lobbying from corruption not only in Hungary but also in the entire post socialist region.
Many explain this phenomenon by the fact that politics are present throughout the preparation
and implementation of tenders connected to the implementation of large scale projects –
exerting  significant influence on international relations and the national economy – and are
capable of pursuing their ‘expectations’.
Based on the experiences of the survey and further to our knowledge we want to make
recommendations in the following areas in order to mitigate the risk of corruption associated
with the public procurement process:
?  regulations,
?  preparation of tenders,
?  the decision-making process, and
?  control and monitoring.
3.2.1 Moderating corruption risk by amending the regulation (PPA)
Regulations pertaining to public procurement have been elaborated with the approach that
they assume the existence of adequate development strategies and development programs
and the knowledge of related resources. However, the system is currently not apt to ensure
this. The solution may lie in the appropriate harmonisation of the above mentioned aspects
and the practical implementation thereof.
Amendment of the PPA currently in force is on the agenda of Hungary. Let us review the
substantial elements of the planned amendment of public procurement regulations13
(PPA) aimed at reducing corruption:
                                               
13 The new public procurement regulation, if promulgated by the Parliament to the end of December 30, 2003 –
will enter into force in some terms on January 1, 2004 but finally on May 1, 2004.
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?  Reduce the circle of exemptions to a minimum level, and any other possibilities to
circumvent the law. It is encouraging in terms of closing some “corruption front
doors” introduced recently in chapter 2.1 of this study.
?  So far, it was not possible to sanction irregularities that were found after the expiration
of the short deadline available to seek legal remedy. In the event of the gravest
offence, i.e., circumventing the PPA, the option for subsequent legal remedy will
be extended for a 1-year period.
?  As compared to the Act currently in force, the new law follows a more differentiated
structure and sets forth three public procurement value limits14. It does mean that
practically each procurement from public money has to be done through a public
procurement procedure.
?  As new elements: each public procurement organisation must publish an annual
public procurement plan until March of each year. Several questions have come up
in connection with the preparation of the public procurement plan: who should it be
submitted to and does it also affect small businesses? Local governments may face
further problems in that they will not know the framework limit of their budgets in due
course based on which they ought to prepare their public procurement plans. No
specific details pertaining to implementation are available as yet!
?  Institutions requesting bids must prepare an annual public procurement summary
report at the end of each year to the attention of the CPP for statistical purposes.
Failure to comply with this requirement will entail sanctions in the future.
Publication of the report issued on the performance of the public procurement will
be mandatory.
?  The recommendation of the Council for Public Procurement pertaining to unrealistic
commitment, hopefully, will be incorporated into the bill. This would force the
institution requesting bids to screen unrealistic, and unsustainable bids.
?  Training activities by the Council for Public Procurement (CPP) will be more
pronounced (public procurement experts will take part in special courses). It is very
important to train more public procurement experts both in number and of higher
quality.
?  The range of current qualification criteria of qualified bidders will broaden and
companies holding the status of qualified bidders should hopefully enjoy the
advantage of being relieved from at least some of the administrative burdens (within a
specific timeline and subjects).
?  The certification procedure means the taking over of the EU-guideline. It will be an
independent organisation who will certify the regular public procurement practice of
the institution inviting the tender. There are some doubts because details are not yet
clarified. They consider that requiring the collaboration of an external and independent
advisor is particularly unnecessary in cases where the company has its own experts.
?  The institution of conciliation will also be derived from the EU-guideline (which
institution does not yet operate flawless in the EU either). In principle, PPAC offers a
conciliation process faster than the 15-day legal remedy procedure, provided that the
parties need to reconcile a case of misunderstanding and not a case whereby the
interests of either the requestor of the bids or those of the bidder are violated. Parties
concerned on both sides consider the introduction of the conciliation procedure as
                                               
14 These limits are the following: a public procurement limit reaching and/or exceeding the European
Community value limit, a limit reaching and/or exceeding the national value limit, and a limit below the national
value limit. The latter limit means that a so called simple procurement procedure will be introduced from HUF 2
millions (USD 9,000) in terms of products and services and from HUF 10 millions (USD 45,000) in case of
investments.
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favourable, yet they think that the current deadlines are too short. Keeping such short
deadlines will not facilitate the alleviation of the CPP’s or the PPAC’s workload.
?  The bill does not bring about significant changes in terms of controls. It mainly
aims at reinforcing the operation of audit organs already functioning. no new and
specific forms of verification are introduced under the modifications. It must be
examined form the point of view of corruption whether it can become a practice that a
bidder wins the assignment thanks to offering good conditions, then through continual
modifications (change of deadline, price increase) the bidder ends up providing a
service that is actually worst than what the competitors would have provided. The law
does not sanction deviations from the contracts.
The law currently in effect is almost fully suitable to regulate individual procurements,
however it is less apt to handle large volume, reoccurring procurements. Although EU
directives do contain guidelines as to the framework contract-based procedures, this pertains
only to public service providers. Those dealing with centralised public procurements regret
that the amendments to the regulations do not contain procedures supporting the
framework contracts of centralised public procurements. For centralised public
procurements, when defining the scope of centrally procured products, it would make sense to
request a proposal from a sample representing the institutions providing the scope of products
they consider should be part of centrally procured products. This proposal could serve as the
basis to help avoid disputes about the standards and the scope of centrally procured products.
Finally one more problem: the public procurement act (PPA) does not recognise the practice
of negative reference and does not provide the opportunity for equitableness. Bidders start
with a clean slate in every procedure. This already ensures the principle of equal
opportunities, yet the situation may make us think twice: a company who has abused the
goodwill of the clients on several occasions (inadequate, not on time of performance), but can
show a sufficient number of references, will not be excluded from the tender. In trying to find
a solution to this particular situation, it may constitute a problem that the results of tenders
financed directly from the central budget are not collected in a place accessible by all,
although such centralised collection would carry significant advantages in terms of making
the information public. Naturally, we all agree that if a company, through no fault of its own,
fails to perform adequately on one occasion, should not be excluded from among bidders.
However, no one likes to deal with repeated problems.
3.2.2 Handling corruption risk during the creating and decision-making process of
tenders
Based on the wishes of many, granting the option to submit missing documentation in
the course of public procurement procedures should also be harmonised! The reason we
think this is a well founded request is because today, during the preparation phase of public
procurement tenders – for example in research – there seem to be way too much fuss about
formal errors.
We share the opinion of many: the system of certifications to be submitted for the tenders
is obsolete, it needs to be simplified and modified, as bidders often have to procure
certificates and the institutions inviting tender must request such certificates,  that will not be
needed any longer after their submission; such a certificate serves no purpose.
Proper separation of the institution inviting the tender and the decision-maker would
reduce the chances of corruption to a minimum, yet, such segregation would entail additional
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duties for those taking part in the process; they would have to prepare very detailed and
accurate documentation so that all relevant information may be passed on to the decision-
makers in the event they have not participated in the preparatory stage. How to put this into
practice is not clear as yet.
It would be important to elaborate a more differentiated system of evaluation criteria
(with weightings) used for the evaluation of the bids. In order to achieve this, the person(s)
responsible for public procurements within the organisation should agree with the expert who
is capable to express the definition of key substantial elements in a mathematical approach.
In the case of publicly procuring intellectual products (research, advisory services, or
creative activities) we consider the multi-round, pre-qualification, negotiated open public
procurement procedure as being the most appropriate one, perhaps using a two-envelop
system, so as intellectual products be evaluated not only on the basis of price and delivery
deadline as sole determining factors.
3.2.3 Moderating corruption risk in public procurement by control and monitoring
We share a uniform opinion with the sample interviewed by us that there is no need to
further tighten the control of public procurement procedures. Instead, the fulfilment of
the contracts following the procurement procedures should be monitored and deviations be
sanctioned. According to the recommendation of construction companies, targeted audits
should be carried out at the local governments to that end.
Unfortunately we think that the conditions capable of ensuring a meaningful substantive
control and monitoring of goods/services/investments created as a result of the public
procurement process are not yet available. These conditions partly lack the financial
background and partly miss electronic support.
According to certain extreme opinions,15 “the institution of monitoring is practically
unknown in Hungary”. Indeed, it would be necessary to prepare an actual analysis (e.g.
impact study) instead of formal reports upon the completion of some large scale assistance
projects. It would be worth considering that, similarly to the EU practice, a predefined
percentage of assistances should be allocated for that purpose.
On the basis of the discussions at the - November 24, 2003 Budapest - workshop FME is
enforcing the necessity of preparing more impact studies before introducing new acts or
amendments. The benefit coming from the results of impact studies could be summarised in
less administrative overburden of bidders and organisations inviting bids and also in better
prepared monitoring system based on content-analysis.
Developing such kind of impact studies would be desirable also before developing a lobby act
in Hungary.
                                               
15 Anna Szalai: EU comes, corruption goes? Daily newspaper Népszabadság, September 6, 2003 (p.12.)
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